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Where to look for change? A critique of the use of modern slavery and trafficking 
frameworks in the fight against migrant domestic workers’ vulnerability 
 
Abstract 
Once an overlooked theme in legal scholarship, the legal treatment of migrant domestic workers 
has recently seen a significant growth of scholarly interest. In European legal scholarship, much 
of the focus has been on severe forms of exploitation such as slavery, forced labour and 
trafficking. While extreme abuses of migrant domestic workers certainly do take place in Europe, 
they are only part of the story. This article critiques the turn to modern slavery and trafficking as 
the dominant frame for analysing migrant domestic workers’ vulnerability in Europe and proposes 
a corrective lens. I argue that it is instead more useful, and potentially more deeply transformative, 
to comparatively examine the role of national labour and migration law regimes in the regulation 
of migrant domestic workers, as well as, the role of EU law in constructing and challenging these 
regimes.  
Keywords: domestic workers; migrant workers; labour exploitation; modern slavery; 
Article 4 ECHR 
 
1. Introduction 
Once an overlooked theme in legal scholarship, the legal treatment of domestic workers has 
recently seen a significant growth of scholarly interest. Given that a large share of domestic 
workers are international migrants,1 several studies explore the legal status and special 
vulnerabilities of migrants in domestic work.2 The debate at the level of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and the adoption in 2011 of Convention 189 on decent work for domestic 
workers has raised global awareness concerning the gaps in the legal protection of domestic 
workers and influenced reforms at the national level. In different parts of the world, campaigns, 
                                                          
1 According to ILO statistics, at least 17.2% of domestic workers are migrants; the sector’s high informality 
levels and the irregular residence status of some migrants mean that the share of migrants in domestic work 
might be significantly higher than what official figures indicate. Tayah M. J. “Decent Work for Migrant 
Domestic Workers: Moving the Agenda Forward” (Geneva: International Labour Office, 2016).  
2 Fredman S. “Home from Home. Migrant Domestic Workers and the International Labour Organization 
Convention on Domestic Workers”, in Costello C. and Freedland M. (eds.), Migrants at Work: Immigration 
and Vulnerability in Labour Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014); Fudge J. “Global Care Chains, Employment 
Agencies, and the Conudrum of Jurisdiction: Decent Work for Domestic Workers in Canada”, Can. J. 
Women & L. (2011) 23, 235-264; Mullally S. and Murphy C. “Migrant Domestic Workers in the UK: 
Enacting Exemptions, Exclusions and Rights” Human Rights Quarterly (2014) 36, 397- 
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policy and legislative reform projects seek to improve the working and living conditions of 
domestic workers and reduce their vulnerability to exploitation and abuse.3 There is, we can say, 
an undisputable momentum at the global level to look for solutions to domestic workers’ many 
vulnerabilities that range from notoriously low wages, long and unregulated working hours, to 
harassment at the workplace and disadvantages related to migration status, to name a few. 
In European legal scholarship, it was human rights and gender scholars, especially those focusing 
on the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), who first became interested in the 
situation of migrant domestic workers. Human rights and gender scholars were driven by case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Strasbourg Court) concerning extreme 
abuse of migrant women under article 4 ECHR; this led, in turn, to an almost exclusive focus of 
the European legal scholarship on egregious human rights abuses such as slavery, servitude, 
forced labour and trafficking in human beings.4 Similarly, advocates for migrant workers’ rights 
are increasingly invoking the modern slavery and human trafficking discourses to challenge 
restrictive legal rules and are organising their campaigns for expanded rights and protections 
around anti-slavery arguments.  
Scholars and advocates resorting to the modern slavery and human trafficking frameworks have 
made important and valuable contributions; their analyses draw attention to the acute 
vulnerabilities migrant domestic workers are exposed to and show how these can be addressed by 
European and international human rights law. While extreme exploitation in the forms of forced 
labour and trafficking is undoubtedly part of migrant domestic workers’ lived experience in 
Europe,5 it is only a small part of the story. Thus, grounding the legal debate almost exclusively 
on these themes can be problematic and ineffective for a series of reasons.  
First, the focus on the most extreme forms of abuse and exploitation runs the risk of failing to pay 
sufficient attention to the role of law in creating day-to-day, less flagrant but equally important 
and much more widespread, instances of vulnerability. As the ECtHR interprets them, extreme 
forms of abuse – slavery, servitude and forced labour – set a very high threshold of abuse. Slavery 
                                                          
3 Human Rights Watch, “Claiming Rights. Domestic Workers’ Movements and Global Advances for Labor 
Reform”, 27 October 2013, available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/10/27/claiming-rights/domestic-
workers-movements-and-global-advances-labor-reform (13 May 2017).  
4 Mantouvalou, V.  “Am I free now?” Overseas Domestic Workers in Slavery, JLS (2015) 42(3), 329-57; 
Mantouvalou, V. “Servitude and forced labour in the 21st Century: the Human Rights of Domestic 
Workers”, IndLawJ (2006) 35(4), 395-414; Demetriou D. “Tied Visas and Inadequate Labour Protections: 
a formula of abuse and exploitation of migrant domestic workers in the United Kingdom” Anti-Trafficking 
Review (2015) 5, 69-88; Murphy, C. “The enduring vulnerability of migrant domestic workers in Europe” 
ICLQ (2013) 62, 599-627; Mantouvalou, V. “Human Rights for Precarious Workers: The Legislative 
Precariousness of Domestic Labor” CLLPJ (2012), 133-166; Mullally, S. “Migration, gender and the limits 
of rights” in Ruth Rubio Marín (ed.), Human Rights and Immigration, (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 145-177; 
Mantouvalou V. “Workers without rights as citizens at the margins” CRISPP (2013) 16(3), 366-382. 
5 Fundamental Rights Agency, Severe labour exploitation: workers moving within or into the European 
Union (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015).  
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entails a right of legal ownership over a person; a person must be sold, bought and treated as an 
object.6 Servitude is similar but broader than slavery and entails the use of coercion; this practice 
requires “a particularly serious denial of freedom”, in addition to the obligations to provide service 
to another and live on another person’s property while having no possibility to alter one’s 
situation.7 As regards forced labour, the ECtHR has relied on Art. 2(2) ILO Convention 29 to 
affirm that two criteria must be met: work or service is extracted from a person under the menace 
of any penalty and the person did not offer herself voluntarily.8   
Second, the focus on extreme abuse falls short of articulating holistic, preventive and 
transformative solutions to migrant workers’ vulnerability. This is because the approach against 
extreme abuse normally envisions the expansion of criminal law as a remedy. Yet, criminal law 
solutions are not only ineffective in addressing labour exploitation, but their expansion is often at 
the expense of developing alternative legal frameworks and strategies to expand and effectively 
enforce migrant workers’ rights.  
Third, the focus on identifying “victims and villains”, which goes hand in hand with the modern 
slavery and trafficking frameworks, tends to put the blame on individual employers. Viewed 
through a modern slavery lens, the labour exploitation of a migrant domestic worker appears to 
be an isolated case of mistreatment by an – often non-European “uncivilised” – employer.  Such 
framing invokes stereotypes and, in turn, tends to downplay the role of the European host state 
which, through its laws and policies, creates the background conditions that contribute to 
exploitation and abuse.  
The aim of this article is twofold. First, I wish to critique the frequent turn to modern slavery and 
trafficking as the dominant frame for analysing migrant domestic workers’ vulnerability in 
Europe. I argue that the focus on extreme abuse may obscure and make less likely other, 
potentially more deeply transformative framings. Second, I wish to point to what such an 
alternative framing should entail; instead of focusing on extreme forms of abuse, I argue that it is 
more promising to comparatively examine national immigration and labour law regimes on 
migrant domestic workers, as well as the contribution of EU law in constructing or alternatively 
challenging those regimes. A caveat is necessary here: it is beyond the scope of this article to 
examine the different national European and EU legal regimes on migrant domestic workers. The 
intention of my critique is rather to invite those interested in the situation of migrant domestic 
workers in Europe – scholars and activists alike – to rethink the way we approach, analyse and 
                                                          
6 Art. 1 of the 1926 Slavery Convention. 
7 Siliadin v France, European Court of Human Rights, App No 73316/01 Judgement of 26 July 2005, para 
123 and cited case law.  
8 Siliadin v France, para 118. 
 4 
 
challenge labour exploitation and broaden our perspective away from an exclusive focus on severe 
exploitation. 
The structure of the discussion is as follows. Section 2 asks why the modern slavery and 
trafficking discourses have become dominant in the European legal scholarship on migrant 
domestic workers. I argue that, apart from the ECtHR case law on Art. 4 which has been an 
important driver of this focus, two important misconceptions have also contributed to this focus. 
The first concerns the profile of migrant domestic workers in Europe today and the second, their 
exclusion from the personal scope of protective EU labour law sources. These two misconceptions 
are related and stem, I believe, from the focus of the legal debate on the UK as the paradigm case 
of the status of migrant domestic workers in Europe. Section 3 examines the limits of the modern 
slavery and trafficking frameworks in articulating transformative solutions and identifies certain 
risks this approach entails. Section 4 concludes.  
2. The turn to human rights for migrant domestic workers in Europe: invoking 
modern slavery, servitude, forced labour and trafficking discourses to remedy 
vulnerability 
In 2005 the European Court of Human Rights handed down a judgement which has come to be 
considered a landmark for the protection of migrant domestic workers in Europe. In Siliadin v 
France9 the ECtHR relied, for the first time, on the underutilised art. 4 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to rule that states have positive obligations to protect 
individuals from slavery, servitude and forced labour.10 This was also the first time that a regional 
European Court addressed domestic workers’ exploitation and offered redress to a severely 
abused migrant domestic worker who was found to be a victim of servitude. It is from this moment 
on that Europe-based legal scholars became increasingly interested in the situation of migrant 
domestic workers and started drawing on human rights law sources to challenge exploitation.11 
Subsequently, in the 2010 Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia judgement, the Strasbourg Court 
construed art. 4 to include a prohibition of trafficking in human beings.12 Even though Rantsev 
did not concern domestic workers, it was seen as relevant for its “recognition of the links between 
                                                          
9 Siliadin v France, European Court of Human Rights, App No 73316/01 Judgement of 26 July 2005.  
10 The Strasbourg Court already had established case law on positive obligations deriving from Article 2 
on the right to life and Article 3 on the prohibition of torture.  
11 Having said that, I do not mean that no one researched the exploitation of migrant domestic workers in 
Europe before Siliadin. Sociologists like Bridget Anderson documented abuse long before; see her widely 
cited book ‘Doing the dirty work?’ The Global Politics of Domestic Labour (London/New York: Zed, 
2000). But, to the best of my knowledge, legal scholars who studied domestic work in Europe before 
Siliadin did so from the perspective of national labour and social security law in the context of mono-state 
studies without paying any specific attention to international human rights law sources. See for instance, 
Quesada Segura R. El contrato de servicio doméstico (Madrid: La Ley, 1991); Cueva Puente M. La relación 
laboral de los empleados de hogar (Valladolid: Lex Nova, 2005).  
12 Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, European Court of Human Rights, App. No 25965/04, Judgement of 7 
January 2010.   
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immigration status and vulnerability to exploitation”.13  In 2012, the ECtHR confirmed states’ 
positive obligation deriving from art.4 ECHR in two cases litigated by migrant domestic workers 
without a legal migration status – the C.N. and V. v France and the C.N. v UK judgements.14   
The ECtHR’s case law on slavery, servitude, forced labour and trafficking set the scene for the 
European legal debate on migrant domestic workers. Since the ECHR binds all Council of Europe 
states, human rights advocates saw a promising avenue for redress against exploitation in the 
ECtHR’s positive obligations doctrine on the basis of art.4 ECHR. As universal norms, human 
rights are applicable to all within a state’s jurisdiction; the prohibitions of slavery, servitude, 
forced labour and trafficking – as enshrined in international and regional human rights law 
instruments – hold a strong promise of delivering protection to exploited non-nationals, including 
those lacking legal residence under migration law.15 Understandably, scholars and activists alike, 
saw a transformative potential in the ECtHR’s case law and turned to the anti-slavery/anti-
trafficking discourses in attempts to “engage a powerful legal obligation”16 that could be invoked 
not only against the state, but against private individuals as well.    
 
In what follows, I first present examine the ECtHR’s case law on art.4 and migrant workers’ 
exploitation. Even though this case law has been extensively analysed, a brief discussion here 
serves to highlight certain aspects that will then allow me to assess the judgements’ effectiveness 
in challenging vulnerability. I then turn to the two flawed assumptions and examine how these 
might be related to the fact that the holder of the UK’s overseas domestic worker visa scheme has 
come to be seen as the paradigmatic type of migrant domestic worker in Europe.  
2.1. The case law on Art.4 ECHR and the – unfulfilled –promise of states’ positive obligations 
Siliadin v France concerns the case of a 15-year old girl from Togo who was recruited in her 
country of origin to work as a live-in domestic worker in Paris for a French family of Togolese 
origin. The employers had promised to cover her schooling expenses and to regularise her 
migration status once in France. It was agreed that at the beginning Siliadin would receive no 
                                                          
13 Murphy C. “The enduring vulnerability of migrant domestic workers in Europe” ICLQ (2013) 62, 599-
627, at 619.  
14 C.N. v UK, European Court of Human Rights, App. No 4239/08, Judgement of 13 November 2012; C.N. 
and V. v France, European Court of Human Rights, App. No 67724/09, Judgement of 11 October 2012.  
15 A quote from Siobhán Mullally illustrates well this point: “The inclusion of those who are strangers to 
the state in the panoply of human rights obligations disrupts the settled boundaries and imaginaries of state 
sovereignty, bringing to the fore the promised universalism of human rights norms and their transformative 
potential”. Mullally S., “Migration, Gender and the Limits of Rights” in Rubio-Marín R. (ed) Human Rights 
and Immigation (Oxford: OUP, 2014) 145-176. For a similar assessment, see Mantouvalou V. “Workers 
without rights as citizens at the margins” (2013) 16(3) Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy, 366-382.  
16 Fudge J. and Strauss K., “Migrants, unfree labour and the legal construction of domestic servitude. 
Migrant domestic workers in the UK” in Costello C. and Freedland M. (eds.), Migrants at Work. 
Immigration and Vulnerability in Labour Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014).  
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salary in order to pay off the cost of her plane ticket. She arrived in France in 1994 on a tourist 
visa but instead of sending her to school, the employers withheld her passport and made no 
arrangements to change her visa. After working for some months without pay, the employers 
“lent” her to a well-off couple with four children. Siliadin’s working and living conditions were 
abusive and exploitative; she worked without respite for 15 hours per day, seven days a week 
taking care of the family’s children, cooking and cleaning. She was allowed out of the house only 
occasionally, received no salary except for some occasional pocket money and instead of a private 
room, she slept on the floor in the children’s room. When at some point she managed to escape 
the household, the Committee against Modern Slavery – a platform of French civil society 
organisations – assisted her in bringing claims against her employers in French tribunals. 
Siliadin’s civil action was successful and the Paris employment tribunal awarded her 
compensation amounting to approximately 33 000 Euro for unpaid wages, holiday leave and 
notice period.17 
However, Siliadin brought her case to the Strasbourg Court arguing that France did not fulfil its 
positive obligations deriving from Art. 4 ECHR. She complained that French criminal law, as it 
stood at the time, did not afford her effective protection against slavery, servitude and forced 
labour. As the ECHR does not define the concepts of slavery, servitude and forced labour, the 
Strasbourg Court drew on international law sources to determine to what extent the applicant 
could be considered a victim of any of the three practices. Thus, the claim that the applicant was 
a victim of slavery was rejected because Siliadin’s treatment did not fulfil the requirements of 
Art. 1 of the 1926 Slavery Convention, i.e. to be treated as an object.18  
Yet the Court held instead that she was a victim of forced labour and of servitude. As regards 
forced labour, the ECHR applied the two criteria Art. 2(2) of ILO Convention 29 sets: work or 
service is exacted from a person under the menace of any penalty, while the person does not offer 
herself voluntarily. To determine whether Siliadin’s situation could fall under the definition of 
forced labour, the Court relied heavily on the fact that she was a minor: “[…] the Court considers 
that the first criterion was met, especially since the applicant was a minor at the relevant time, a 
point which the Court emphasises.”19 The Court also said that it could not be considered that 
Siliadin had offered herself voluntarily as “it is evident that she was not given any choice”.20 
Turning to the issue of servitude – i.e. “the obligation to provide one’s services imposed by the 
use of coercion” – 21  and in light of the fact that she was minor, had no resources, lacked a legal 
migration status, had no documents and no freedom of movement, the Court held that Siliadin 
                                                          
17 Siliadin v France, paras 9-45.  
18 Siliadin v France, para 123. 
19 Siliadin v France, para 118. 
20 Siliadin v France, para 118.  
21 Siliadin v France, para 123 and cited case law. 
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was also a victim of servitude.22 I will return to the implications of these findings in the next 
section where I discuss the effectiveness of ECtHR case law.  
Siliadin v France was celebrated in human rights scholarship. For Virginia Mantouvalou, the 
judgement “showed the potential of the ECHR to address violations of labour rights” because the 
Strasbourg Court established that Article 4 can be applied horizontally in relations between 
individuals which implies the state’s positive duty to intervene in the employment relationship so 
as to protect the vulnerable party.23 On an even more optimistic assessment, the judgment was 
also seen as a step towards bridging the gap between civil and social rights’ protection in Europe.24 
 
In 2010 the ECtHR handed down the Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia judgement. The case 
concerned trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation. The applicant’s daughter, Oxana 
Rantseva a young Russian woman, arrived in Cyprus on the basis of a so-called “artiste” visa to 
work as a dancer in a cabaret nightclub. It was widely known that the term “artiste” was a 
euphemism for a visa that was channelling migrant women to prostitution. When Oxana Rantseva 
sought protection from local authorities, the police handed her back to the cabaret owner. In her 
second attempt to escape, she tragically died by falling from the building where she was kept. The 
victim’s father brought the case to Strasbourg.  The Court, building on its previous case law on 
Article 4, held that states’ positive obligations extend to penalising and prosecuting trafficking as 
well as to taking effective measures to protect individuals from trafficking and exploitation.25 
Cyprus was inter alia condemned for enacting and maintaining a migration scheme that exposed 
migrant women to great vulnerability; the state was found to be complicit because the authorities 
were well aware that the artiste visa was a disguised route to forced prostitution but did nothing 
to stop migrant women’s sexual exploitation 
In C.N. and V. v France the applicants were two sisters from Burundi who arrived in France, with 
the help of their uncle and aunt already established there, fleeing their home country’s civil war. 
They were both minors at the time and fully dependent on their uncle and aunt for subsistence. 
The applicants were ill-treated in their relatives’ household; they were physically abused by their 
aunt, made to live in unhygienic conditions, were refused medical treatment and were verbally 
harassed on various occasions. In addition to the abuse, the older of the two sisters had to take 
care of the family’s seven children, to do all household chores, was permanently on-call and 
                                                          
22 Siliadin v France, paras 126-129.  
23 Mantouvalou V., “Servitude and forced labour in the 21st century: the human rights of domestic workers” 
(2006) 35 Industrial Law Journal, page 395. 
24 Mantouvalou V., “Labour Rights in the European Convention of Human Rights: An Intellectual 
Justification for an Integrated Approach to Interpretation”, (2013) 13(3) Human Rights Law Review, 529-
555.  
25 Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, paras 283-286.  
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received no pay or days off. After the applicants’ aunt and uncle were partially acquitted by the 
French criminal courts, the Committee Against Slavery brought their case to the ECtHR arguing 
inter alia that France failed to protect the applicants from forced labour under Art. 4 ECHR. The 
Court found that only the older sister was a victim of forced labour. Then, following its Siliadin 
case law and noting that there was still no criminal law provision against forced labour or 
servitude in domestic law, held that France breached its positive obligation “to set in place a 
legislative and administrative framework to effectively combat servitude and forced labour”.26  
The facts in C.N. v UK are very similar to those in Siliadin. The applicant, a young woman from 
Uganda and allegedly a victim of sexual violence in her home country, entered the UK on a false 
passport and visa she obtained with the help of a so-called S., a wealthy and apparently powerful 
relative of hers. When the applicant arrived in the UK, S. confiscated her travel documents and 
through an agent, arranged for her to work as a live-in carer for an elderly couple. C.N. worked 
long hours seven days a week, was permanently on-call and was given only a few hours per month 
time-off. Her freedom of movement was effectively restricted not by her employers but by S. who 
controlled and constantly threatened the applicant that she would be abused and expelled from 
the UK. C.N. received no wages for her work as S. withheld all payments the elderly couple made 
to the agent. When she finally escaped, C.N. was in very bad conditions with frail physical and 
mental health. She unsuccessfully applied for asylum and then filed a complaint to the police 
stating that she was a victim of domestic servitude.27  
UK legislation as it stood at the time contained no free-standing criminal offence of domestic 
servitude if there was no trafficking element. Since C.N.’s status as a victim of trafficking could 
not be established, the police could not investigate her allegations. C.N. brought her case to the 
ECtHR and complained that the UK had failed to protect her from servitude and was thus in 
breach of Article 4 ECHR. The Strasbourg Court found a lacuna in UK law as it contemplated no 
specific offence of domestic servitude; because of this lacuna, the Court asserted, UK authorities 
were not able to take into account all the factors that made C.N. fall under the control of S.28 
Building on its case law in Siliadin – the only factual differences between the two cases were that 
C.N. was not a minor and that the abuse was perpetrated not by the employers but by her relative 
– the ECtHR found that the UK had breached its positive obligations under Art.4 by not enacting 
adequate legislation to afford practical and effective protection against servitude.  While the case 
was pending in Strasbourg, the UK enacted legislation that explicitly made slavery, servitude and 
forced labour a criminal offence.  
                                                          
26 C.N and V v France, para 108.  
27 C.N. v UK, paras 4-31. 
28 C.N. v UK, paras 76-77. 
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The cases that reached Strasbourg provide powerful narratives of extreme abuse and appalling 
exploitation. All applicants were either minor or very young women, coming from poor non-EU 
countries, who fell prey to powerful individuals, were deceived, taken advantage of and either 
died while trying to escape their abusers or found themselves in a dire situation. The need to 
eradicate such practices and remedy such injustice is self-evident. Characterising migrant 
domestic workers’ exploitation as “modern slavery” or “trafficking” can be a tempting strategy 
because these discourses have strong symbolic connotations and provide for compelling 
arguments. Yet, to what extent can this framing and the intervention the ECtHR envisions be truly 
transformative for migrant domestic workers? I return to this question in section 3.  
2.2. Misconceptions: who are migrant domestic workers and which supranational norms apply 
to them? 
European human rights scholarship seems to assume that domestic workers are typically non-EU 
nationals who in addition lack legal residence. Mantouvalou, for instance, writes: “Domestic 
workers are also very often migrant, and immigration legislation in many national legal orders 
also disadvantages them. The lack of citizenship status (as legal status) leads to their exclusion 
from additional labour rights.”29 This view, however, conflates the notions of migrant worker with 
that of third-country national, overlooks the diverse migration statuses domestic workers hold and 
the sharply different legal treatment EU law – and consequently national law – affords to different 
types of migrants moving and working within the EU. Clearly, the author’s aim is to emphasise 
the decisive role of migration law in creating disadvantage. Yet this role is more complex; if we 
treat migrant workers as a “unified category of precarious residents”30 we miss the opportunity of 
giving a nuanced account of how migration law creates disadvantage and which migration rules 
make the difference.  
Migrants work and move within the EU on a broad range of migration statuses: EU migrant, 
transitional EU migrant, family member of an EU migrant, third-country national, family member 
of a third-country national, asylum seeker, refugee and so on.31 The legal treatment of these 
categories can be sharply different under EU law. For instance, an EU migrant domestic worker 
moves and takes up work under a legal framework that reduces the vulnerabilities typically 
associated with the migration experience. She does not need to be sponsored by an employer, may 
enter a Member State as a jobseeker to explore different employment opportunities, can freely 
change employers, and may move into a sector with better conditions, while being entitled to the 
                                                          
29 Mantouvalou V., “Workers without rights as citizens at the margins, (2013) 16(3) Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy, 366-382.  
30 Fudge J. “Making Claims for Migrant Workers: Human Rights and Citizenship” (2014) 18(1) Citizenship 
Studies, 29-45, 16. 
31 Anderson B, “Migrant Domestic Workers: Good Workers, Poor Slaves, New Connections” (2015) 
22(4) Social Politics, 636-652.  
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same rights and protections as national workers. Migrants who are EU nationals enjoy enhanced 
protection against expulsion even after employment has ended, they can be accompanied by 
family members – who also gain rights to residence and labour market access – have certain 
voting rights and more straightforward paths to citizenship.  In addition, EU migrant workers 
enjoy intra-EU mobility rights which means that they can move freely between Member States 
for the purpose of employment or become circular migrants and move back and forth between 
their country of origin and place of work.32 This robust set of rights and protections means that 
an EU domestic worker is not equally legally vulnerable as some types of non-EU migrants.  
 
Despite what has been normally assumed in the scholarship centred on severe forms of labour 
exploitation, not all domestic workers in Europe are third-country nationals. In some Member 
States, for instance Italy, Sweden and Spain, EU nationals outnumber third-country nationals in 
domestic work; to ensure their rights, one does not need to go as far as the prohibitions of slavery 
in international human rights law but could more usefully invoke EU free movement law.  
 
But not even third-country nationals are a homogenous category. EU law treats them differently 
depending on whether the EU has signed an Association and Cooperation Agreement with their 
country of origin; crucially, the type of Agreement shapes very distinct legal statuses.33 For 
instance, a Swiss or a Norwegian domestic worker – think of a young person on an au pair 
placement – has a legal status that is akin to that of an EU citizen and cannot be considered equally 
legally vulnerable as an au pair from the Philippines. Similarly, Turkish and Maghreb workers 
have a different set of rights under EU law – albeit not as robust as EU nationals – that place them 
in a different position. Because of all these complexities, an analysis of the role of migration law 
in creating migrant workers’ disadvantage must be more nuanced and attentive to the impact of 
EU migration law.      
The turn to international and European human rights law is also related to the misplaced debate 
concerning the coverage of domestic workers by protective EU labour legislation. In their search 
for transformative sources, European legal scholars focusing on severe exploitation have 
overlooked the potential of EU labour law in challenging some of domestic workers’ 
vulnerabilities on the assumption that EU labour law does not apply to domestic workers. 
Similarly, those campaigning for migrant domestic workers’ rights at the national level have not 
                                                          
32 Marchetti’s study on care workers in Italy shows that circularity is a very much preferred migration and 
employment pattern for eastern European women in the sector. Marchetti S., “Dreaming circularity?: 
Eastern European women and job-sharing in paid home care” (2013) 11 (4) Journal of Immigrant and 
Refugee Studies,347-363.  
33 For a comprehensive account see, Eisele K., “The external dimension of the EU’s migration policy. 
Different legal positions of third-country nationals in the EU: A comparative perspective (Leiden: Brill 
Nijhoff, 2014).  
 11 
 
invoked compliance with EU law rights as a strategy to boost rights and protections at work. The 
view that EU labour law does not apply to domestic workers has relied on the textual exclusion 
of domestic workers from the personal scope of the EU Directive on health and safety.34 While 
few scholars have explicitly analysed the role of EU labour law as regards domestic workers, 
those who have analysed the issue tend to assume that the exclusion in the Health and Safety 
Directive automatically implies the further exclusion of domestic workers from various other 
pieces of EU labour law.35 This assumption has been dominant and unchallenged until recently.  
I have argued elsewhere that the analysis of domestic workers’ position within the personal scope 
of EU labour law has been misplaced; a closer and more nuanced scrutiny reveals that most EU 
individual labour law sources – with the exception of the Health and Safety Directive – apply or 
should be interpreted as applying to domestic workers as well.36 Crucially, these sources are 
applicable to all migrant domestic workers regardless of immigration law status;37 thus, even an 
illegally resident domestic worker can still derive rights from EU labour law. Those working to 
improve the rights and entitlements of domestic workers in EU Member States should start paying 
more attention to the potential of EU labour law sources and the case law they generate as tools 
against some of the vulnerabilities national regimes create. Because EU law prevails over national 
law, it is important to raise awareness, both in academic debates and amongst migrant domestic 
workers’ advocates, of the applicability of most sources of EU labour law so that they can use 
these sources to scrutinise national law. For instance, the Working Time Directive38 can be used 
to challenge domestic workers’ exemption from maximum weekly time or the non-calculation of 
their on-call hours,39 the Pregnant Workers Directive to fight against dismissal in the event of 
pregnancy, the lack of maternity leave or the obligation to perform night work,40 the Recast 
                                                          
34 See Art. 3(a) Directive 89/391/EEC and the discussion in Mc Cann D. “New Frontiers of Regulation: 
Domestic Work, Working Conditions and the Holistic Assessment of Non-Standard Work Norms” 34 
Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal, 167-184.  
35 For analyses explicitly assuming this view see, Mc Cann D. “New Frontiers of Regulation: Domestic 
Work, Working Conditions and the Holistic Assessment of Non-Standard Work Norms” 34 Comparative 
Labor Law and Policy Journal, 167-184; Mantouvalou V. “What is to be done for migrant domestic 
workers” in Ryan B. (ed.) Labour Migration in Hard Times (Institute of Employment Rights, 2013); 
Rodgers L. “Labour Law, Vulnerability and the Regulation of Precarious Work” (Edward Elgar, 2016). 
Catharina Calleman, on the other hand, has criticised this assumption which has nonetheless prevailed in 
Swedish debates concerning labour standards in domestic work. Calleman C. “Domestic Services in a Land 
of Equality: The case of Sweden” 23 C.J.W.L, 121-139. 
36 Pavlou V., “Domestic work in EU law: the relevance of EU employment law in challenging domestic 
workers’ vulnerability”(2016) 41(3) European Law Review, 379-398.   
37 See case Tümer v Raad van bestuur van het Uitvoeringsinstituut werknemersverzekeringen (C-311/13) 
EU:C:2014:2337.  
38 Directive 2003/88/EC. 
39 For an analysis of how EU law challenges Spanish regulation on domestic workers’ on-call hours see, 
Pavlou V. “El potencial del derecho laboral de la UE para luchar contra la vulnerabilidad de los trabajadores 
domésticos. Implicaciones para el ordenamiento jurídico español” (2016) 76 Revista de Derecho Social 83-
106. 
40 Directive 92/85/EC. 
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Directive may be used to address harassment at work, including complainants’ victimisation41 
and the Written Statement Directive can tackle domestic workers’ lack of information concerning 
their employment relationship.42 Receiving information might seem trivial in challenging abuse 
at the workplace, yet the Written Statement Directive is an important resource for domestic 
workers. In a sector where informal norms and practices prevail, written information on hours of 
work, pay, holidays and specification of tasks is a way to introduce the language of rights in a 
relationship often perceived as casual.  This directive is also an important tool in promoting labour 
standards’ enforcement in a sector where labour inspection is notoriously problematic and 
collective organisation particularly limited.  
EU law is of course not a panacea. My argument is not that there is a body of substantive EU 
labour law which addresses the full range of migrant domestic workers’ vulnerabilities. There are 
issues of crucial importance that EU law does not regulate. Migrant domestic workers cannot rely 
on EU law to get, for instance, higher pay or to challenge a dismissal falling outside the material 
scope of anti-discrimination directives. Nor do I claim that domestic workers effectively enjoy all 
the rights and protections EU law grants them on paper.  My claim is rather that EU labour law 
sources contain a range of important rights and protections which are applicable to migrant 
domestic workers as well. From this follows that, whenever there is a mismatch with the rights 
and protections national law offers, EU law sources can be used to challenge national law. 
Advocates for domestic workers’ rights could usefully put more emphasis on compliance with 
EU labour law as a strategy to pressure for legislative and policy changes at the national level. 
EU labour law sources can in this way become useful tools not only for individual litigants but 
for all domestic workers – both migrant and national – as a group.  
2.3. The UK’s visa scheme on overseas domestic workers as the paradigm 
European legal scholarship focusing on extreme abuse of migrant domestic workers draws 
significantly on the UK case;43 this line of scholarship tends to treat the holder of the UK visa as 
the paradigmatic type of the vulnerable migrant domestic worker in Europe. This approach has 
influenced the assumptions mentioned above concerning the profile of domestic workers and the 
supranational legal norms applicable to them. To be sure, the UK’s immigration regime on 
domestic workers has certain characteristics and peculiarities that make it stand out as particularly 
problematic; thus, the scholarly attention and critique it attracts is very much justified.  However, 
                                                          
41 Directive 2006/54/EC. 
42 Directive 91/533/EEC.  
43 Mantouvalou, V.  “Am I free now?” Overseas Domestic Workers in Slavery, JLS (2015) 42(3), 329-57; 
Mantouvalou, V. “Servitude and forced labour in the 21st Century: the Human Rights of Domestic 
Workers”, IndLawJ (2006) 35(4), 395-414; Demetriou D. “Tied Visas and Inadequate Labour Protections: 
a formula of abuse and exploitation of migrant domestic workers in the United Kingdom” Anti-Trafficking 
Review (2015) 5, 69-88; Mantouvalou V. What is to be done for migrant domestic workers?, in Ryan B. 
(ed) Labour Migration in Hard Times (Institute of Employment Rights, 2013).  
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the UK’s scheme is not necessarily representative of how migrant domestic labour is regulated in 
European states, and thus, it may not be suitable in giving an accurate and full account of the role 
of law in creating vulnerability. Besides, the discourses on migrant domestic labour as a form of 
modern slavery have special resonance in the UK because of the visa’s trajectory. 
From the mid-1970s migrants were allowed to enter the UK as domestic staff accompanying 
wealthy foreign employers, normally investors, businessmen and diplomats. Formally, they had 
no residence permit and no right to work in the country; their entry was allowed as a concession 
so as to facilitate foreign investors and other wealthy expats who wished to bring their domestic 
staff to the UK. In absence of an independent legal status, migrant domestic workers were fully 
dependent on their employers for both work and residence and they were considered illegally 
resident in case they escaped an abusive employer.44  
Abuse was indeed widespread at the time and thousands of migrant domestic workers were 
trapped in a situation of illegality. This situation prompted domestic workers to form an advocacy 
group, Kalayaan, and start a long process of mobilisation which lasted for about two decades.45 
Their main claim was the introduction of a special visa for domestic workers that would allow 
them to change employers. As Bridget Anderson explains, such visa diverged from general labour 
immigration rules which normally do not permit change of employers; thus, migrant domestic 
workers’ claimed to be treated as British workers.46 To achieve this, Kalayaan argued that 
domestic work’s specificities, i.e. isolation in the household and intimate relationship with the 
employer, justified a special treatment under immigration law.47  
That campaigning was successful and the overseas domestic workers visa was finally introduced 
in the late 1990s. While far from perfect – there was no independent entry right because domestic 
workers still had to accompany a foreign employer – the visa guaranteed important rights: it was 
renewable, it granted an independent residence permit, the crucial right to change employers, 
labour rights, family reunification rights and a path to permanent settlement.  
In 2012, in line with the UK’s broader policy of restricting entry to all but the most highly-skilled 
third-country nationals, the visa came under attack and its terms were substantially amended. 
Under the new rules, migrant domestic workers are granted a six-month non-renewable visa, have 
no right to change employers, no path to permanent residence and no family reunification rights. 
                                                          
44Lalani M, “Ending the abuse: Policies that work to protect migrant domestic workers” (London: Kalayaan, 
2011).  
45 Anderson B, “Mobilising Migrants, Making Citizens: Migrant Domestic Workers as Political Agents” 
(2010) 33(1) Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies, 60-74.  
46 Anderson B, “Migrant Domestic Workers: Good Workers, Poor Slaves, New Connections” (2015) 22(4) 
Social Politics, 636-652. 
47Anderson B, “Migrant Domestic Workers: Good Workers, Poor Slaves, New Connections” (2015) 22(4) 
Social Politics, 636-652.  
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This time, however, due to the prevailing anti-immigration climate, it was much more difficult to 
claim that migrant domestic workers should be treated as British workers. Thus advocates, in 
search of an effective vocabulary to fight against the immigration changes, turned to anti-slavery 
arguments hoping that these would have more public resonance.   
The current UK regime on migrant domestic labour is an excellent example of a problematic 
temporary migration arrangement that sets the background conditions for abuse and exploitation 
to take place.  For those European scholars analysing the exploitation of migrant domestic workers 
with the UK model in mind, it made sense to make the link with modern slavery. However, 
because it only regulates the entry of third-country nationals accompanying wealthy foreign 
employers and because of its very restrictive conditions, the UK visa depicts the migrant domestic 
worker in a very specific way. Thus analyses focusing exclusively on the UK tend to imagine 
migrant domestic workers mainly as a unified category of third-country nationals, often without 
a legal right to stay, brought to Europe by non-European employers. This framing has contributed 
in directing scholars to international and European human rights law sources as being, 
presumably, the only available and applicable resource to challenge migrant domestic workers’ 
vulnerability to exploitation and abuse.  
3. The limits of the modern slavery and trafficking frameworks 
After having examined the reasons that the European legal debate on migrant domestic workers 
has been almost exclusively centred on extreme abuse, I turn to examine what could be the limits 
and risks of this approach.   
3.1. Focuses on the extreme, trivialises the daily  
Siobhán Mullally rightly observes that “as in other areas of international law, it is primarily the 
moments of crisis – incidents of human trafficking, slavery, or forced labour – that have captured 
the attention of human rights law”.48 Yet, by focusing on the most extreme forms of abuse, we 
run the risk of failing to pay sufficient attention to, equally important and much more widespread, 
daily instances of vulnerability. With daily instances of vulnerability I refer to practices that may 
not amount to forced labour but still constitute important dimensions of domestic workers’ labour 
exploitation. These are, for instance, low wages, unlawful wage deductions, unfair dismissals, 
lack of protection against pregnancy-related discrimination, long and unregulated working hours, 
lack of information as regards working conditions, as well as vulnerabilities related to migration 
status. 
                                                          
48 Mullally, “Migration, gender and the limits of rights” in Human Rights and Immigration, 2014, above, 
page 169.  
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The cases that reached ECtHR illustrate the high threshold of abuse that must be met for Art.4 to 
be triggered. Clearly, not just any denial of freedom will fall under the definition of servitude; 
rather, denial of freedom must be of a “particularly serious form” coupled with coercion. In 
Siliadin the Court looked into a series of factors to determine whether the applicant was a victim 
of servitude: the fact that she was minor, that she was illegally resident in France, that she had no 
freedom of movement, no passport and practically no one to turn to for support. Siliadin’s age 
was a decisive factor in the Court’s assessment.49 Similarly, to determine whether her treatment 
amounted to forced labour, the Court examined whether work was exacted from her under threat 
of a penalty and whether she did not offer herself voluntarily. In Siliadin’s case both criteria were 
met precisely because she was a minor and as the Court notes, she was given “no other choice”. 
Yet, her lack of choice was due to her very specific circumstances of age, residence illegality and 
isolation. These criteria will not be met by the vast majority of migrant domestic workers in 
Europe who are adult women, often with previous studies and work experience, migrating out of 
the need to work and sustain themselves and their families back home and normally hold a legal 
migration status. Arguably, they too have no other choice; yet, this is not the lack of choice Art.4 
ECHR is concerned with.  
By setting a high threshold of abuse, servitude and forced labour encompass a narrow 
understanding of vulnerability as treatment that is egregious and exceptionally bad. Such 
conceptualisation of vulnerability risks normalising and trivialising day-to-day forms of abuse 
and exploitation that do not reach this high threshold but are part of migrant domestic workers’ 
lived experience. When juxtaposed to the plight of migrant workers – such as C.N. or Siliadin – 
who were minors, deceived, were not allowed to leave the household, had their passports 
confiscated, slept on floors and received no payment in exchange for their arduous work, abuse 
that is not as extreme looks less like abuse. In a context where migrants’ labour exploitation is 
equated to slavery-like conditions, expanding rights at work becomes less urgent. Claiming, for 
instance, that there should be limits and adequate compensation for domestic workers’ on-call 
hours, seems less important than saving them from “modern slavery”. But what does saving 
migrants from modern slavery entail? 
3.2. Favouring criminal law and restrictive migration policies on the expense of other 
strategies   
When labour exploitation is characterised as servitude or trafficking, this framing inevitably calls 
for a criminal law approach to address the problem.50 According to the ECHR’s jurisprudence on 
Article 4, states’ positive obligations entail enacting and effectively enforcing criminal laws 
                                                          
49 Siliadin, para 129.  
50 Fudge J. “Modern Slavery and Migrant Domestic Workers: The Politics of Legal Characterisation” (The 
Foundation for Law, Justice and Society, 2016).  
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against slavery, servitude, forced labour and trafficking; states were condemned precisely because 
their criminal law frameworks were deemed inadequate.  Thus, the Strasburg Court, prescribes a 
criminal law approach to migrant workers’ exploitation but without going beyond that. Arguably, 
an effective criminal law machinery may deter employers from engaging in highly abusive 
practices. Yet, a criminal law approach to labour exploitation has significant limitations. First, 
only the egregiously bad treatment falling within the legal definitions of slavery, servitude, forced 
labour and trafficking will be addressed. Second, criminal laws have strict rules regarding proof 
and liability which restrict even further the opportunities to engage them. Third, even if the 
employer’s liability is established, a criminal law approach will only be concerned with punishing 
the perpetrator, while the only remedy available to the migrant worker would be compensation 
for the harm suffered; thus, the expansion of criminal law provisions does little in terms of 
ensuring migrants’ rights at work.51 
European legal scholars had high hopes that the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on migrants’ labour 
would be transformative, “raise awareness, inspire action and lead to systemic reform”.52  While 
this is of course a desirable outcome, the way governments have made use of these judgements 
has been proved unsatisfactory and at times, highly problematic. The case of the UK tells a 
cautionary story. The UK government coupled the enactment of criminal laws against slavery 
with the removal of migrant domestic workers’ essential rights and protections through the visa 
reform. Tellingly, the government justified the restrictive turn partly on the need to “protect” 
domestic workers from abuse. In the words of Theresa May who was the Home Secretary in 2012 
when the visa regime was overhauled:  
“We recognise that the overseas domestic worker visa can at times result in the import of 
abusive employer/employee relationships to the UK. It is important that those who use 
these routes to bring their staff here understand what is and what is not acceptable. […] 
But the biggest protection for these workers will be delivered by limiting access to the 
UK through these routes. We are restoring them to their original purpose to allow visitors 
and diplomats to be accompanied by their domestic staff – not to provide permanent 
access to the UK for unskilled workers.”53 (emphasis added) 
Through this paternalistic response to vulnerability, the state manipulated legitimate claims by 
migrant women to be free from abuse so as to restrict their access to a legal migration status.54 
                                                          
51 Fudge J. and Strauss K., Migrants, Unfree Labour and the Legal Construction of Domestic Servitude: 
Migrant Domestic Workers in the UK in Costello C. and Freedland M. (eds.) Migrants at Work: 
Immigration and Vulnerability in Labour Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014).  
52 Mantouvalou, V. “Workers without rights as citizens at the margins” 2013, above; Mantouvalou, V. 
“Modern Slavery: the UK response” 2010, above.  
53 Theresa May, Written Statement to the Parliament: Immigration (employment-related settlement, 
overseas domestic workers, tier 5 of the points-based system and visitors), 29 February 2012, at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/immigration-employment-related-settlement-overseas-
domestic-workers-tier-5-of-the-points-based-system-and-visitors-wms (1 March 2017).  
54 See also, Mullally, “Migration, gender and the limits of rights” in Human Rights and Immigration (2014), 
145-177, above.  
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Restricting migration policies with the pretext of protecting migrant domestic workers from abuse 
was coupled with the UK’s refusal in 2011 to vote in favour of the ILO Convention 189 on decent 
work for domestic workers; the UK was one of the very few states to abstain in the vote. On 
another development, in 2012 the UK the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal 
developed a very problematic line of jurisprudence that effectively restricts domestic workers’ 
entitlement to the minimum wage when they live in the employer’s household and are treated “as 
a member of the family”.55 These rulings – based on an ambiguously wide exemption in 
Regulation 2(2) of the UK’s National Minimum Wage Act – are deemed to impact third-country 
national domestic workers because they are the ones most likely to live-in.56 States can be very 
conveniently at the forefront of the fight against slavery and trafficking while at the same time 
make policy and legal regime choices that create the backdrop for migrant workers’ abuse and 
exploitation to take place.  
 
What broader lessons can we draw from the way migrant domestic workers’ exploitation has been 
framed and addressed in the UK? Inevitably, framing migrant workers’ exploitation exclusively 
as a problem of modern slavery and trafficking leads to criminal law responses which may have 
undesirable outcomes.  Labour law, instead of criminal law, ought to be the main legal tool when 
looking for solutions against labour exploitation. Defending the applicability of the full range of 
labour law rights and protections to all domestic workers is a crucial – even though certainly not 
sufficient – condition in migrant making domestic workers less vulnerable to exploitation at work. 
In this context, it is important for European legal scholarship concerned with this issue to reveal 
and challenge the premises for domestic workers’ historical exclusion from pieces of national 
labour law legislation, as well as to examine strategies that make labour rights meaningful and 
enforceable for domestic workers regardless of their status under migration law.  
3.3. Stereotypes and ineffectiveness in challenging the role of the state  
The modern slavery discourse tends to depict migrant domestic workers as poor slaves in the 
hands of abusive, foreign employers. Migrants’ labour exploitation is framed not as a structural 
problem of how immigration and labour law regimes work in synergy to produce vulnerability, 
but as an imported problem of foreign, uncivilised villains abusing their domestic staff. The facts 
of the cases that reached Strasbourg are illustrative of this framing; with the exception of Rantsev, 
all other applicants were brought to Europe by powerful, well-off individuals coming from 
African countries. It is difficult to avoid such stereotypical depictions when applying a modern 
slavery frame to migrant domestic workers. For instance when arguing that the UK’s domestic 
                                                          
55 Jose v Julio [2012] ICR 487 UKEAT; Nambalat v Taher and Tayeb [2012] EWCA Civ 1249. 
56 Anderson B, “Who needs them? Care Work, Migration and Public Policy” (2012) Cuadernos de 
Relaciones Laborales, 45-61.  
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worker visa should be classified as a “visa of enslavement”, Virginia Mantouvalou inevitably 
underlines that the majority of holders of that visa come from Arab countries in the Middle East, 
especially Qatar, where, as she argues, the abuse of domestic workers is institutionalised due to 
the kafala system applied in those countries.57 These narratives, while certainly well-intended, are 
not helpful as they tend to activate a double stereotype as regards migrants’ labour exploitation: 
that abuse happens in the hands of ‘uncivilised’ others and that exploitative labour relationships 
are just imported in the European host state. In turn, such stereotype is easily manipulated to 
neutralise the role of the state – i.e. of the European host state – in contributing to the creation of 
those background conditions that make migrants’ labour exploitation possible.  
The roots of migrant domestic workers’ labour exploitation are various, complex and often 
attributed to intersections of race, gender and class disadvantage.58 Martha Nussbaum writes that 
there is a certain “social stigma” associated with paid domestic work as an occupation 
predominantly carried out by poor and racialized women.59 This social stigma is also linked to 
domestic work’s legacy of slavery and colonialism.60 In addition, the location of the work – the 
private household – is a crucially important factor contributing to domestic workers’ 
vulnerability. This is because of the ideologically constructed binary between the public sphere 
of work and the private sphere of the home; historically, this binary has been the premise of 
conceptualising work within the household as unproductive as opposed to productive, market 
work. Work within the household, considered as part of women’s innate duties, has been carried 
out by women on an unpaid basis throughout the centuries. This has contributed to domestic 
work’s social devaluation and those who perform it – women.  
Yet law – in particular immigration and labour law – not only reflects ideological biases around 
paid domestic work, but has an important role in constructing and sustaining different aspects of 
migrant domestic workers’ vulnerability. Immigration law may impose restrictions to migrant 
workers’ freedom – for instance to change employers or sector – while labour law may exclude 
or partially include domestic workers in the personal scope or rights and protections at work. 
Immigration and labour law regimes thus work in synergy to produce vulnerability. To say that 
law has a constitutive role is not to deny the social and economic drivers of labour exploitation; 
                                                          
57 Mantouvalou V. “Am I free now? Overseas Domestic Workers in Slavery”, (2015) JLS 42(3), 329-57.  
58 Browne I. and Misra J. “The intersection of Gender and Race in the Labor Market” (2003) Annual Review 
of Sociology 29, 4817-513; Anderson B., Doing the dirty work? The Global Politics of Domestic Labour 
(London: Zed, 2000).  
59 Nussbaum M., Sex and Social Justice (New York/Oxford: OUP, 1999); Nussbaum M., “Whether from 
reason or prejudice: taking money for bodily services” Vol 27 (52) The Journal of Legal Studies 1998, 
693-724.   
60 ILO Decent Work for Domestic Workers Report no IV(1) at the International Labour Conference 99 th 
session (Geneva: ILO, 2009). 
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it is rather a call for nuanced accounts of how law combines with those drivers to create conditions 
conducive to exploitation.61  
The role of the state lies in the enactment, interpretation and enforcement of laws that both reflect 
and produce disadvantage. Yet the discourses on slavery, forced labour and trafficking are not 
effective in challenging the state’s role in this respect. The Strasbourg jurisprudence on Article 4, 
while acknowledging that there is a link between migration regimes and vulnerability, falls short 
of envisaging the kind of positive obligations that could address the vulnerability of domestic 
workers holistically; it fails to articulate positive obligations with the potential to be truly 
transformative.  
The case of Cyprus illustrates my claim. When the Rantsev case was brought to Strasbourg, the 
complicity of the Cypriot state in the sexual exploitation of migrant women became widely 
known. The facts of the case made clear that the visa conditions, set by the state itself, facilitated 
trafficking and exploitation. The features of the artiste regime the European Human Rights Court 
found most problematic were that the visa tied the migrant to the cabaret owner/employer who 
had to lodge a bank guarantee to cover any potential costs related to the migrant’s stay and to 
inform the authorities in case the migrant left the place of work; the bank guarantee was often 
used as a tool of coercion and control.62 The ECtHR’s adverse finding against the Cypriot 
authorities created an international pressure that could not be easily ignored. It was partly due to 
this pressure that Cyprus was obliged to gradually abolish the artiste visa regime.63 In this case, 
litigation at the ECtHR had a positive impact that went beyond providing relief to an individual 
victim,64 to create overarching results for vulnerable female migrants as a group.  
But while this problematic immigration path was closed down, the Strasbourg Court does not 
establish a state obligation to guarantee any safe alternatives and there is no comprehensive 
scrutiny of the state’s immigration regime. Importantly, the visa regime on migrant domestic 
workers, which shares striking similarities to the abolished artiste visa, remains firmly in place 
                                                          
61 Providing detailed accounts of the role of law in producing labour exploitation is beyond the scope of 
this paper. For illuminating analyses of this theme, see, Anderson B., Migration, immigration controls and 
the fashioning of precarious workers (2010) 24(2) Work, Employment and Society, 300-317; Fudge J. 
Precarious migrant status and precarious employment: the paradox of international rights for migrant 
workers, (2012) 34(1) Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal, 95-131.  
62 Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, para 292.  
63 I would suggest that there were also various internal factors that contributed to the abolition of the visa. 
For instance, the work of the Cypriot Ombudsman gave visibility to the problem, campaigning by local 
NGOs and the change to a somewhat more gender equality-committed government in 2008. The accession 
of Cyprus to the EU in 2004 was also a contributing factor. On the one hand, the process of accession gave 
the impetus for legal and policy changes in various fields. On the other hand, the simultaneous accession 
of eight Central and Eastern European states as well as of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and the 
liberalisation of migration rules meant that demands for migrant women in the sex industry could be partly 
covered by intra-EU migration.  
64 Of course, in the Rantsev case, the relief was not granted to the actual victim of the violations but to her 
father. 
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and unchallenged. The three elements the Court found problematic as regards artiste visas – tied 
status, bank guarantee and employer’s obligation to inform the authorities – form also part of the 
Cypriot visa regime on TCN domestic workers.65 For the ECtHR to intervene there is a need for 
an identified, individual victim to first exhaust all domestic remedies before filing a claim to 
Strasbourg.  In other words, it seems that we would need another victim like Oxana Rantseva but 
this time on a domestic worker visa for the ECtHR to pressure the Cypriot state to abolish or 
reform its visa regime.  
Thus, even if the Strasbourg Court has made some steps towards acknowledging the nexus 
between immigration and vulnerability, the approach it contemplates is not effective in remedying 
migrant domestic workers’ vulnerability in a holistic and most importantly, preventive way. A 
truly transformative positive obligation would be, for instance, requiring states to establish 
independent migration routes that allow migrant domestic workers to enter the national labour 
market under conditions of freedom and equality to national workers, while having paths of 
acquiring permanent residence and eventually, full citizenship.    
 
That is why it crucial to bring the state back to the centre of our analysis. The role of national 
immigration and labour law regimes – and crucially, their intersection – in creating and sustaining 
migrant domestic workers’ vulnerability to exploitation deserves deeper analysis. This analysis is 
best done through a comparative approach, i.e. examining how national legal regimes regulate 
migrant domestic labour in different European states. A comparative lens, instead of single-state 
studies, can shed new light on the role of law. Because domestic work is a less protected type of 
work, single-state analyses will normally conclude that national law disadvantages domestic 
workers vis à vis other workers.  While this finding is of course important, it is not attentive to 
the fact that law may create different degrees of vulnerability. Thus, a comparative analysis offers 
a more nuanced picture. Comparing and contrasting the regulation of domestic labour in various 
countries sheds light to the very different ways in which law structures and, in certain instances, 
may contribute in reducing vulnerability. A comparative lens makes evident that, while there are 
problematic aspects in all regimes, some regimes are less problematic than others. This kind of 
analysis opens up possibilities to challenge restrictiveness; as the different degrees of 
vulnerability are revealed, the more progressive aspects of one national regime can become a tool 
in pursuing legal and policy change in another national context.  
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4. Conclusions 
In this article I set out to examine the limitations and risks of framing migrant domestic workers’ 
vulnerability to exploitation in Europe as mainly a problem of modern slavery, forced labour and 
trafficking. Such framings tend to obscure and make less likely other, potentially more deeply 
transformative, approaches to migrants’ labour exploitation. While slavery-like conditions at 
work, as well as trafficking, are certainly part of migrant domestic workers’ lived experience in 
Europe, they are only a small part of the story. That is why we need alternative framings to analyse 
vulnerability to exploitation and claim legal change that goes beyond remedying egregious human 
rights abuses. Starting from the premise that the state, through its laws and policies, has an 
important role in shaping migrant domestic workers’ vulnerability to exploitation, I have argued 
that the state must be in the centre of our analyses. I have thus advocated that future analysis of 
migrant domestic workers’ vulnerability in Europe should focus more on how national labour and 
migration law regimes regulate migrant domestic workers, as well as, on the role of EU law in 
both constructing and, alternatively, challenging aspects of these regimes. There is no 
contradiction in saying that the law creates vulnerability and then turning to the law as a tool to 
remedy vulnerability; the key is in identifying, or designing, those legal tools with the potential 
to challenge vulnerability and conduce to transformative change. We are, I believe, likely to find 
such transformative legal tools if we look in EU law and in national legal regimes in a comparative 
perspective.  
 
